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The  qualifying  aspect  of  the  ongoing  changes  in  firm  growth 
processes seems to be the increased heterogeneity of size and a trend 
towards  a  broader  fluctuation  in  average  size.  Exogenous  factors 
(market  size,  demand  trends,  technological  innovations,  higher 
competition) determine a different impact on firms will to increase 
their own size, while endogenous variables play a greater role than in 
the  past.  The  outcome  is  represented  by  a  growth  pattern  that 
characterises some firms, but not all of them. Growth appear to be  
an asymmetric phenomenon, involving selectively but not casually a 
subgroup of firms. In the present paper it is hypothesized that growth 
stems  from  the  asymmetric  distribution  of  internalized  resources 
(both material and immaterial), allowing some firms (regardless of 
the original size) to enter evolutionary paths that others don’t want or 
simply can’t enter. 
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1.  AN “ENDLESS STORY”
3   
 
‘Growth is a subject of all times’ (Philipsen and Kemp 2003), and it couldn’t be 
otherwise  since  few  economic  phenomena  appear  to  be  so  important  on  the 
empirical level, as complex and elusive on the interpretative one. The increase of  
manufacturing output is indeed due to the expansion of existing firms’ activities, 
resulting  in  their  size  growth  (in  terms  of  turnover,  added  value,  sometimes 
employment):  two  thirds  of  the  increase  of  production  experienced  in  western 
countries in the past decades has its roots in the expansion of existing structures, 
and one third only is linked to the creation of new firms (Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
If the expansion of the firm is such a crucial issue for the overall growth of an 
economic  system,  it  is  of  little  surprise  to  note  how  intense  and  relatively 
continuative – even if to some extent frustrating – the research has been on the 
determinants of firm size, and on the constrains on activity extension (Kumar et al. 
1999). The number of surveys on the issue, both recent and not, seems surprisingly 
high and the same goes for single contributions.
4 
However, as in every endless story
5, even in the field of firm growth some 
characters change, as well as the contexts and the narration rhythm, even if the 
conclusion  of  the  plot  is  still  far  away.  The  study  of  firm  growth  has  many 
milestones that appear constant, even if there are many questions still unanswered, 
while other questions need a new formulation. It is perhaps the very nature of the 
issue that, changing through time and assuming different forms, won’t allow an 
ultimate definition. In recent years, moreover, applied research seems to focus on 
new issues. This is due not only to the fact that old approaches to the problem are 
now out-of-date, but also to the emerging of new dynamics in industrial structures 
and  organizational  assets,  so  that  a  rethinking  of  the  categories  on  which  all 
previous considerations were based appears to be necessary. 
Starting from understanding why and how firms grow (Delmar 1997; Davidsson 
et al. 2005; Traù 1996; Sutton 1997; Coad 2007), the question shifted on which 
firms actually increase their size. The issues appear to be similar, as answering the 
first would  provide an answer to the second as well, and vice versa. Indeed, the 
differences are broad and regard the assumptions the precede both the issues. The 
first  question  –  which  are  the  determinants  of  size  growth  -  presumes  that 
economic  organizations,  on  average  similar,  face  an  unique  evolutionary  path 
based on size growth and selective processes that discriminate less efficient (or less 
fit) firms. The growth is spurred by exogenous forces (technological supply, end-
products demand, market size, etc), while the single organisation reacts more or 
less swiftly to the context and its changes. At any time all firms can benefit of 
growing opportunities, even if some firms grasp such opportunities while others 
                                                            
4 A proxy of the numerical relevance of contributions on the issue can be excerpted by clicking the 
keyword “firm growth” on Google Scholar (15.900 results as of April 2008) 
5 The expression refers to a twentieth century narrative model, structured to develop without an end 
(soap operas, comics etc). See Reynolds (1992) and Butler (1986)   4 
don’t.  What  is  really  relevant  is  the  average  rate  of  growth  (thus  the  trend  of 
average firm size) and the confirmation that the size distribution results skewed as 
provided for by the Gibrat law. 
      In the second approach – which are the firms that actually grow -  the reasoning 
appears  reversed:  the  starting  point  becomes  the  final  result  of  the  previous 
analytical  scheme.  The  main  question  regards  explaining  why  few  firms  do 
actually grow, and the identification of the features differentiating growing firms 
from  not-growing ones. The focus  hence shifts  from exogenous to endogenous 
components  and  concerns  the  asymmetric  distribution  of  internalized  resources 
(both material and immaterial), allowing some actors (regardless of the original 
size) to enter evolutionary paths that others don’t want or simply can’t enter. 
Two further distinctions can be drawn with respect to the traditional approach. 
The  first  regards  the  idea  that  the  size  (whatever  unit  is  adopted  for  the 
measurement)  hides  a  great  organizational  heterogeneity  as  far  as  across  size 
categories (small vs large) and within size class (small vs small, large vs large) are 
concerned. The second element refers to the fact that growth is only apparently 
linked  to  a  casual  evolutionary  path  (the  random  walk  envisaged  by  the 
contributions à la Gibrat - 1931). Indeed, assuming a high variety within the same 
size category, it is possible that only certain firms will prove to be adapt to the 
growth: some possess organizational and strategic resources that allow them to  
benefit from the evolving context, while many other organizations will not.   
The  approach  considering  growth  as  an  asymmetric  phenomenon,  involving 
selectively but not casually a subgroup of firms, appears to be particularly useful as 
a contribution on the debate on the structural change in manufacturing industry, 
which has been for a long time restrained to the small-large size dichotomy. 
There is plenty of evidence suggesting that the shift in the structure of industrial 
systems goes beyond such dichotomy as sector structures seem to evolve towards 
more complex configurations. The first signal is represented by the consolidation 
of a set of firms of intermediate size, not small nor large, characterised by a great 
vitality  in  terms  of  turnover  and  added  value  expansion,  but  also  in  terms  of 
employment,  performance  on  international  markets  and  a  specific  focus  on 
innovation related investments. The success of this new type of firm represents a 
new interpretational challenge, and several recent contributions try to investigate 
on the issue.
6 Moreover, industrial clusters display a greater size stratification than 
in the past (Dei Ottati 1996; Coltorti 2008), there is the strengthening of larger 
organisations  within  the  SME  context,  external  growth  via  acquisitions  regards 
more and more SMEs (Iacobucci 2002, 2008, Iacobucci and Rosa 2005). Also de-
verticalisation processes are now experiencing relevant transformations as far as 
both transaction management and exchange contents are concerned (Giunta et al. 
2008). 
The  qualifying  aspect  of  the  ongoing  changes  seems  to  be  the  increased 
heterogeneity of size and a trend towards a broader fluctuation in average size. 
Exogenous factors (market size, demand trends, technological innovations, higher 
                                                            
6 International literature paid little attention to the issue of “medium” enterprises. See Clifford and 
Cavanagh (1985), Simon (1996), Lindqvist (1997), Perks and Bell (2002), Arrighetti e Ninni (2008).    5 
competition)
7 determine a different impact on firms will to increase their own size, 
while endogenous variables play a greater role than in the past. The outcome is 
represented by a growth pattern that characterises some firms, but not all of them. 
This  ends  in  diverging  growth  paths  (some  firms  do  increase  their  size,  while 
others  don’t),  but  it  doesn’t  always  have  an  impact  on  the  number  of  active 
organisations.  
Growth selectivity does not regard quantitative-structural aspects alone (which 
firms  grow,  which  don’t).  It  deals  with  qualitative  components  regarding  the 
composition of internalised resources, as well. From such perspective, the signals 
of an increased average size in given sectors are due to the growing impact of 
endogenous  factors  such  as  the  need  to  strengthen  the  hierarchical  or  semi-
hierarchical control over intermediate goods exchange, the presence of threshold 
effects in the valorisation of extra-productive functions and the impossibility to 
acquire  such  “outer”  inputs  on  the  market.  The  incorporation  of  production  
coordination resources determines an increase in fixed costs that spurs the firm, 
for both prudential and profitability reasons, to increase the level of the output and 
raise the operating scale (Arrighetti and Traù 2006, 2007). 
In  such  a  context,  the  size  growth  and  the  “new  hierarchy”  are  hence 
characterised  by:  a)  the  strengthening  and  completion  of  the  tertiary  functions 
within  the  organisation,  and  the  subsequent  increase  in  their  relevance  in 
comparison  with  strictly  manufacturing  activities;  b)  the  experimentation  of 
solutions  for  the  coordination  of  processes  through  the  adoption  of  the  group 
structure  (as  event  successive  to  the  decision  of  acquiring  pre-existing  units, 
containing the risk linked to the “organic” growth); c) the further exploration of 
hybrid organizational mechanisms and “incomplete” contractual models; d) the re-
positioning within the sector or sometimes the entry in supra-national oligopolies.  
Size growth, from such perspective, doesn’t represent a process of proportional 
(radial) dilatation of internalised resources, but rather the exit from the elementary 
structure of a small firm, towards a broader variety and organisational complexity
8. 
The following part of the work is articulated as follows: next paragraph will be 
aimed at verifying the matching of empirical evidence with theoretical models of 
size growth, gaining insights on the hypothesis of selective growth in terms of 
coherence  with  main  stylized  facts  on  this  issue.  Paragraph  3  focuses  on  the 
subjective features that influence firm  growth paths. Paragraph 4 analyses the role 
of intangible assets and human resources as elements enhancing growth chances. 
Paragraph 5 focuses on the relationship between intangible assets accumulation  
and  firm  size,  providing  an  explanation  for  the  pouring  of  intermediate 
organisational  models.  Paragraph  6  gains  further  insights  on  the  links  between 
growth and external bonds, especially financial ones, while paragraph 7 consists of 
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(2001) 
8 Cfr Truù (1996)   6 
2. OLD AND NEW STYLIZED FACTS 
 
The main stylized fact regarding this issue is represented by the persistency – in 
the long run - of a right-skewed distribution of firms that can be rounded to a 
lognormal, Pareto or Yule (Bottazzi et al. 2003). The law of proportional effects 
describing such order presumes independence of growth rates from starting size of 
a given firm, and hence an erratic trend of size expansion. Even if the Gibrat law is 
not universally confirmed, it represents a key reference in the debate, being able to 
grasp some recursive components that are basically constant in different sectors 
and industrial systems. The attempt of making the available econometric evidence 
consistent with the theoretical prescriptions provided relevant results. As stressed 
by Geroski (1999), current knowledge states that: a) growth appears to be a path 
dependent process (Barney and Zajac 1994), b) size seem not to converge within or 
between  sectors
9;  c)  growth  rates  tend  to  be  idiosyncratic  (absence  of  serial 
correlation). These facts are still lacking of an adequate interpretation  and to be 
unified within a theory of firm. However, the  hypothesis foreseeing discontinuous 
growth rates and differentiated access to development opportunities by incumbent 
firms is consistent with available evidence. Geroski (1999) stresses that the erratic 
trend of size changes shouldn’t be regarded as dominated by pure randomness.  
Stressing that growth stems from unexpected shocks doesn’t mean “that growth is 
driven  by  “mere  chance”  or  “good  luck””.  Since  unpredictability  of  an  event 
depends on the set of information available for each player, it is possible that what 
appears as unexpected to a player outside the sector is easy to predict from another 
inside it. Moreover, assuming non-uniformity in the distribution of information 
within a sector, or different  reactivity of firms to external shocks, it is consistent 
with the evidence  that some firms, in a given moment, have access and can exploit 
the emerging opportunities, while others are not able to grasp such opportunities. 
In other  words, « it is, of course, possible to argue that exogenous factors are 
entirely responsible for the unpredictable nature of corporate growth rates. But 
this is hard to believe. Many firms do not react quickly or well to market shocks, 
and  others  try  to  resist  innovation.  This  inertia  makes  the  timing  of  corporate 
activity difficult to predict, and, hence, it often makes corporate behavior seem 
erratic » (Geroski 1999, p.20). 
The emerging of growth paths characterised by elements of selectivity seems 
consistent  with  some  conclusions  of  recent  works:  a)  the  check  of  the  growth 
proportionality  hypothesis  has  provided  either  a  confirmative  outcome  only  in 
reference to specific size categories (Lotti et al. 2001, 2003;  Becchetti and Trovato 
2002) while  the growth dynamics appear constantly asymmetric between firms 
(Cefis et al. 2001; Bottazzi et al. 2002).  As a consequence, the chances of growth 
could be higher in specific groups of firms and lower in others
10; b) the dynamics 
of industrial concentration (Pryor 2001, 2002; Dosi et al. 2000) stress both the 
consolidation of oligopolistic systems and the survival of a wide range of other 
                                                            
9 See also Geroski et al (2000) and Farinas and Moreno (2000) 
10 For a theoretical interpretation of differences between growth rates of small and large firms, see 
Cabral (1995) and Cabral and Mata (2003)   7 
firms playing a relevant role
11. As a consequence, we experience the strengthening 
of a path dependency effect: firms with relevant size enabling them to enter the 
oligopolistic structure grow to achieve such goal, while others result even more 
confined  in  a  state  of  size  stability;  c)  a  fat-tailed  distribution  of  growth  rates 
(Stanley et al.  1996; Bottazzi et al. 2002) in most industrial systems states that 
only few productive units expand their size, while most of them have a static, zero-
growth dynamics; d) the conditions spurring the emerging of general trends (big 
business for Chandler (1977) or fragmentation for Langlois (2003)) seem to be 
substituted for by ambivalent forces strengthening labour division between firms 
(McLaren  2000)  and  speed  up  the  internalisation  of  coordination  functions 
(Sturgeon 2002); e) finally, opening of international markets calls for a qualitative 
upgrading of manufacturing goods  as well as for a strengthening of managerial 
skills to avoid being exposed to a fierce price competition with newcomers. Not all 
firms can adopt such approach, as firms need sufficient internal organisational and 
technological  resources  to  enter  the  development  path.  Moreover,  in  the 
oligopolistic arena being formed, the competitive space is limited and only few 
firms  can  enter.  Those  who  are  not  able  to  enter  should  focus  on  smaller, 
specialised demand segments, repositioning themselves in market of intermediate 





3. SUBJECTIVE GROWTH INCLINATION 
 
The assumption that firms – all of them – are born to grow and must grow to 
survive is so much common (Sexton 1997) as wrong. From such perspective, firms 
are naturally oriented towards growth and only external ties hinder the pursuit of 
such  goal.  This  universal  tendency  to  growth  appears  inconsistent  from  a 
theoretical point of view, as it doesn’t encompass the role played by organisations 
of different size in the division of labour. Furthermore it assumes the existence of 
optimal firm size, differentiated from sector to sector but univocal within each one 
of them
12. Even from an empirical perspective, it is apparent that only a minority of 
firms actually expand their size in a given timeframe, as the tendency to grow 
seems  to  be  strictly  subjective  and  linked  to  the  personality  and  will  of  the 
entrepreneur
13:  as  demonstrated  by  a  wide  literature,  firms  grow  for  different 
reasons and following different paths (Heinonen et al. 2004)
14, while many display 
                                                            
11  Dosi  et  al  (2000)  stress  the  possible  affirmation  of  a  sort  of  neo-dualism  in  the  international 
organisation of production and services, with changed oligopolistic cores and a turbulent and broad 
“galaxy” of smaller organisations. Among these, the pool of potential Schumpeterian innovators; others 
remain small for the mechanisms of labour division (p.31)  
12  This  is  in  conflict  with  the  evidence  of  the  idiosyncrasy  of  firms  growth  process,  previously 
highlighted (cfr Geroski 1999, Cabral 2007). The absence of size convergence among industrial systems 
of  different  countries  is  a  further  confirmation  (Dunne  and  Hughes  1994;  Hart 2000;  Geroski  and 
Gugler 2004; Bottazzi et al 2003; Dosi et al 2000).  
13 For the analysis of the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation, growth and performance see 
Wiklun-d and Sheperd (2005) 
14 Delmar et al (2003) reach the same conclusions in analysing a group of  firms with high growth rates   8 
no tendency to grow at all (Davidsson 1989; Storey 1994; Gundry and Welsch, 
2001). 
The individual inclination towards growth
15 seems to have an important impact 
(even if influenced by the context in which they operate) on firm performance 
(Baum and Locke 2004; Baum et al. 1998; Delmar and Wiklund 2003; Wiklund 
2001; Wiklund and Shepherd 2003), and the distribution of the growth will seems 
to  be  very  different  among  firms.
16  Moreover,  entrepreneurial  orientation    to 
expand firm size seems to be function of variables such as independence, control 
and  quality  of  the  labour  context:  motivations  that  differ  from  income  related 
objectives. Finally, the consequences of growth can be regarded as negative or 
however capable of undermining the positive results achieved with the original size 
(Wiklund et al. 2003; Mosakowski 2002; Davidsson et al. 2005).   
Given such framework, it is hence of little surprise to see how most firms, once 
achieved  a  given  size  threshold  and  overcome  the  start-up  hindrances,  tend  to 
maintain their size without relevant changes over time (Brown et al. 1990; Storey 
1994; Spilling 1996;  Aldrich 1999; Reynolds and White  1997). Davidsson and 
Delmar (1997), analysing the evolution of Swedish firms over the 1987-96 period, 
stress how only 10% display positive (and modest) growth rates, while others have 
a stationary or even negative trend. Growth doesn’t seem to be typical of a specific 
size  class  of  firms,  even  if  larger  organisations  (>50  employees)  are  over-
represented. Most of the growth is due to mergers and acquisitions of pre-existing 
units, so that “most firms start small, live small and die small” (Davidsson et al. 
2005).
1718 
Moreover, it appears that only a limited number of  small firms is explicitly 
oriented towards strategies of size expansion.
19 Smallbone et al. (1995) in their 
work on high-growths firms observe that 67% of firms of the sample maintained 
their  original  size  for  a  lack  of  orientation  towards  expansion  rather  than  for 




                                                            
15 As highlighted by Coad (2007), the intentional character of growth is already explicit in Penrose 
(1955 and 1959): “Unused managerial services are a key determinant in a firm’s capacity to expand. 
Firms must then decide upon the direction for growth. Managers must search for potential growth 
opportunities and draw up growth plans. As a result, growth is an informed and intentional process. 
Growth  is  seen primarily  as  a  result  of  managerial  decision  and  ‘human  will’  rather  than being  a 
response to technological factors. If, on the other hand, these unused managerial services are involved 
in growth projects that are unstructured or ill-prepared, then they are unlikely to succeed” (Coad 2007, 
p.44). 
16 Moreover, as stressed by Hart (2000), differences in entrepreneurial skills and attitudes are sufficient 
to generate a positively skewed firms distribution. The issue has been developed in Tuck (1954) and 
Lucas (1978), or more recently in Arrighetti and Traù (2007). 
17 It’s been stressed how firms operating in a restricted oligopoly can contain growth as to avoid supply 
increase to determine a reduction in prices (Nelson 1987).  
18 Moreover, as confirmed by some studies (Storey 1994), a small share of fast-growing firms explains 
in every reference period most of the jobs created. Bruderl and Preisendorfer (2000), studying a set of 
new firms, notice that 4 years after the establishment, the labour demand grew, but most of such growth 
refers to a 4% of high-growth firms.  
19 Cfr Curran (1986), Stanworth and Curran (1986) 
20 On the relationship between managers’ optimising behaviours and growth, see Traù (1996)   9 
 
4. HUMAN CAPITAL, INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
 
In an attempt to summarise the conclusions agreed upon by recent literature, we 
can note that: a) the hypothesis of the existence of an optimal firm size (linked to 
both the sector and other factors) and the interpretation of growth as a path towards 
such optimum are not consistent with the emerging empiric evidence. b) growth 
concerns a limited number of firms active in a given timeframe; c) the orientation  
to growth is closely linked to the personality and individual attitudes of managers; 
d)  when  growth  does  occur,  it  is  not  a  linear,  constant  process.  It  is  rather 
characterised by swift speedups followed by sudden standstills or even downsizing 
(absence of positive serial autocorrelation between growth rates). 
The  state  of  the  art  of  current  knowledge  excludes  deterministic  factors  of 
growth, while it gives ground to other, less prescriptive alternative hypothesis, in 
line with the above mentioned evidence, linking internal organizational features 
and resources to the likelihood of growth. Growth could be hence explained by 
firms’ suitability to exploit  market and technology opportunities,  minimising at 
once risks connected to scale expansion. 
Such  a  suitability  is  linked  to  the  redundancy  of  specific  intangible  assets 
(organisational  and  administrative  competences,  broadness  of  control  and 
coordination  structures,  human  capital,  information  and  quality  systems,  
relationship  with  customers    and  suppliers,  innovation  protection,  etc).  Such 
resources  and  their  availability  either  support  or  hinder  the  grasping  of 
opportunities of growth (Penrose)
21 . There is no direct relationship of cause and 
effect between the availability of such resources and the effective growth of an 
organisation. Sometimes intangible assets are used to grow, while in other cases 
they  are  needed  to  strengthen  and  balance  the  internal  organisational  structure. 
Intangible assets, indeed, can be used simultaneously or sequentially for a plurality 
of applications (while tangible assets cannot). Moreover, there are no certainties 
regarding  future  growth:  the  resources  we  are  debating  on  explain  how  an 
economic opportunity in a given time can be turned into a growth opportunity, but 
they are not able to provide any further indication whether  the growth will last or 
not and the path is linear or not. 
Not all firms have redundancy of intangible assets. Since their stock depends on 
onerous investments, the incentive to increase such assets varies from a firm to the 
other. The fixed (or semi-fixed) nature of costs associated to intangible assets spurs 
such investments in some but not all firms. The differentiation in entity, quality 
and  composition  of  intangible  assets  between  firms  brings  back  to  the  idea  of 
selectivity  and  partiality,  which  characterizes  size  growth,  especially  in  recent 
years. 
These  features  appear  in  some  works  analysing  the  link  between  the 
distribution of growth opportunities and subgroups of organisations. Bottazzi and 
                                                            
21 The link to Penrose (1959) is evident. As highlighted by Garnsey (2003), in Penrose contribution 
growth origins from a “‘productive opportunity’ in a cumulative, endogenous process of interaction 
between the firm’s productive base and market opportunities, which are reflected respectively in the 
firm’s ‘organizational capabilities’ and its ‘entrepreneurial judgement’”. 
   10
Secchi  (2005)  re-examine  the  island  models,  originally  elaborated  by  Ijiri  and 
Simon (1977) and later by Sutton (1998). In every single sub-market (island) and 
regardless of what happens in others, it is assumed the existence of a definite flow 
of new growth opportunities. Such opportunities take the form of random events 
that can have a relevant impact on the firm evolution. They can be represented by 
shocks on the demand side, technological rather than managerial or organisational 
innovations, and so on. The actual  growth of firms is dependant on the number of 
projects  that  they  are  able  to  grasp.  The  authors  stress  how  the  assumption  of 
balance in the chances of grasping opportunities by single firms (as in the original 
models)  generates  a  distribution  of  growth  rates  which  is  inconsistent  with 
empirical evidence, highlighting a tent-shaped density. To overcome such limit, it 
is sufficient to remove the previous assumption and  hypothesize that the above 
mentioned  skill  in  exploiting  opportunities  varies  from  firm  to  firm.  In  the 
suggested model, the chances for a firm to acquire a specific project are dependent 
on the number of opportunities already exploited in the past. As a consequence, 
some  firms  with  stronger  attraction  skills  (due  to  scale  economies,  network 
economies and learning economies) will be better able to exploit opportunities and 
grow at a faster pace than other organisations with lower stash of acquired projects. 
The clusterisation of projects and growth opportunities in a limited set of firms is 
consistent with the empirical statement of a fat-tail distribution of growth rates. 
Moreover,  growth  opportunities  appear  to  be  differentiated  as  regards  the 
“organisational  architectures”.  Arrighetti  and  Traù  (2006),  implementing  an 
analytical scheme developed in Sah and Stiglitz (1986 e 1988), stress how different 
organisational structures react to the dimensional and qualitative features of the 
flow of projects crossing a given sector. In poliarchic structures, the decisional 
process is spread between many individual players (micro firms), deciding what 
and how to produce simultaneously but independently from each other. On the 
other hand, in hierarchical structures there is a limited number of big players (large 
firms),  making  their  decisions  through  a  central  authority  and  using  sequential 
procedures. 
In  such  approach,  the  size  of  single  production  units  is  function,  ceteris 
paribus, of the composition of opportunities flow and the degree of information 
imperfection on one hand, and exit costs that firms must afford in case of mistakes 
in  selecting  projects,  on  the  other.  The  opportunities’  features  vary  overtime, 
determining a systematic effect favourable to different architectures from time to 
time.  From  the  empirical  point  of  view,  phases  favourable  to  the  success  of 
elementary production units, in contexts of great demographic turbulence (many 
firms starting and ending their activities)  and little individual growth (poliarchy), 
are followed by phases when larger organisations, with adequate intangible assets 
such as management and decisional skills, provide a better persistence (few births 
and few death) and higher chances of size growth (hierarchy). 
The  skill  of  identifying  and  selecting  the  opportunities,  turning  them  into 
projects,  is  strictly  linked  to  the  coherence  of  the  firm  with  the  flow  of  such 
emerging  opportunities.  Sometimes,  newcomers  have  comparative  advantages  
over incumbents in grasping opportunities. In these circumstances, the flow of new 
chances stems from advances in labour division and exploitation of specialisation 
economies. As a consequence, active firms tend to increase with a prevalence of 
small units. On the other hand, when opportunities are represented by projects of   11
relevant scale which can be better exploited in large organisational contexts, with 
an  adequate  articulation  of  internal  functions  as  well  as  of  property  rights  
protection, it is incumbents (or at least some of them) that are better able to exploit 
new opportunities. Incumbents hence grow while newcomers play a smaller role in 
the overall picture. 
The  ability  to  incorporate  such  kind  of  projects  seems  to  be  linked  to  the 
redundancy of intangible assets internalised by firms. Jensen and McGuckin (1997) 
indeed  state  that  “the  vast  majority  of  variation  in  firm  performance  is  not 
associated  with  traditional  observables  such  as  location,  industry,  size,  age  or 
capital; rather it is associated with unobservable factors specific to the firm or 
business unit, many of which appear to be permanent attributes of the business 
unit. One such attribute is the managerial capital of the firm, another is the skills 
of its workforce”( p. 44). 
Such  assumption  is  consistent  with  the  survey  of  Davidsson  et  al.  (2005), 
stressing  how  managers  education  and  experience,  the  number  or  founding 
members  and  skills  within  the  organisation  have  a  positive  impact  on  growth. 
Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1989)  show  how  the  accumulation  of  R&D  resources 
generates  knowledge  influencing  firm  performance.  Such  knowledge  produces  
absorptive capacity assuming the form of an ability to single-out, incorporate and 
adapt external knowledge for the pursuit of commercial and productive goals (see 
Laursen et al. 1999). The level and character of human resources amplify firm 
skills  in  developing  fruitful  relations  with  external  actors,  strengthening  their 
position on the market. Raffa et al. (1996) conclude in their longitudinal study that 
technical human capital of managers spurs an increase in commercial competences, 
due to higher skills of cooperation with large firms, valorisation of consultants’ 
activities and exploitation of diversification opportunities. Abernethy et al. (2003) 
stress how the development of intangibles is the result of specific investments in 
personnel  training,  product  development,  R&D,  supply  chain  relationships, 
communication  technologies  and  so  on.  Such  expenditures  appear  to  be  pre-
requisites for the strengthening and expansion of firms on the market, playing at 
once as enablers of internal organisation optimisation. 
Chandler  and  Hanks  (1994)  believe  that  a  high  level  of  intangible  assets 
increases the odds of the firm taking advantage of the identified opportunities, 
surviving longer and growing at a faster pace (Limere et al. 2004). 
In recent years, a growing number of empirical studies focused on analysing 
human capital as a component of intangible assets and as a determinant of growth. 
Colombo and Grilli (2005) provide econometric assessments showing how college 
years (especially in the economic and managerial field) of entrepreneurs do indeed 
have a positive impact on the growth of organisations. And the same goes for the 
experience  acquired  in  previous  activities  within  the  same  sector.  Most  of  the 
researches  on  the  issue  agree  on  the  fact  that  human  capital  (managers  and 
employees education, managerial skills etc) has positive effects on the proneness to 
growth, on the perception of opportunities as well as on actual growth rates (Storey 
1994;  Laursen  et  al.  1999;  Nurmi  2004;  Garnsey  et  al.  2003;  Almus  2002; 
McPherson 1996). 
The relationship between human capital and growth appears to be complex and 
subject to interactions with other variables. Particularly interesting is the evidence 
documented  by  Wiklund  and  Shepherd  (2003),  stressing  how  skills  acquired   12
through  experience  and  education  do  not  “force”  deterministically  managers  to 
expand their organisations (Davidsson et al. 2005). The role of human capital is 
strongly  emphasised  in  presence  of  a  considerable  subjective  management 
inclination towards growth. It is the simultaneous combination of high levels of 
both variables that triggers the growth process.  
 
 
5. INCENTIVES SPURRING AN INTERMEDIATE SIZE. 
 
The link between size expansion and intangible assets is hence not mechanical. 
A consistent endowment of intellectual and organisational skills does not generate 
automatically  an  increase  in  firm  size,  as  it  represents  a  pre-condition  for  the 
exploitation  of  external  shocks  in  opportunities  for  internal  development.  The 
accumulation  of  intangible  assets  plays  as  an  increase  in  the  non-tradable 
component  of  a  firm’s  value,  generating  risks  of  informative  opacity  on 
investments  earnings  and  hence  of  bad  allocation  of  resources  (Hart  1995;  EC 
2003). Moreover, it increases the incidence of fixed costs over variable costs, with 
relevant effects on profitability, in contexts of great demand variability. 
As  a  consequence,  the  balance  between  benefits  and  disadvantages  of  an 
intangible asset incorporation can vary significantly, not only between sectors and 
organisations of different age, but also as regards the size variable. The immediate 
postulate is that if the accumulation of intangible assets is inhomogeneous among 
size,  the  odds  of  having  access  to  new  growth  opportunities  are  not  entirely 
unrelated to the initial firm size.   
The  hypothesis  that  some  size  classes  have  better  access  to  growth 
opportunities is only partially consistent with the emerging evidence. However, the 
proposed analytical framework seems to fit available information concerning the 
advantages of medium size enterprises and their recent success in terms of both 
performance and growth.  
The strengthening of an intermediate size, for the proposed scheme, is the result 
of two factors: a) variables affecting the forsaking of smaller size on one hand and 
b) variables affecting the forsaking of larger size on the other. 
 
 
5.1 Variables spurring firms to abandon small size. 
 
If the exploitation of external opportunities is less and less bound to physical 
assets, and evermore to intangible ones, and if the investments on the latter out-
tower those on the former (Nakamura 2001), not only we are experiencing a shift 
in  the  composition  of  controlled  assets,  but  also  a  relevant  change  of  firm 
behaviours. Access and appropriability of intangible assets indeed vary according 
to firm size. Intangible assets appear idiosyncratic to the firm, and less imitable 
than  physical  ones,  even  if  they  are  characterised  by  relevant  indivisibility 
constraints and hence high access thresholds. They can be hence acquired by firms 
operating on a large productive scale, while smaller organisations face hindrances 
in internalising them. Moreover, the optimisation of intangible investment’s cost 
spreading is deeply influenced by the scale of firm activities. Cohen and Klepper 
(1996), by stressing the “fixed” nature of R&D investments and the uncertainty of   13
linked  income-related  benefits,  note  the  existence  of  incentives  for  such 
expenditures directly linked to firm size. Indeed, the larger an organisation, the 
bigger the volume of output on which innovation benefits can be shared (hence the 
smallest the R&D unit costs). The benefits of redistribution of costs are not due to 
the large size of the organisation itself, but rather to the fact that in most cases the 
results  of  internal  innovation  cannot  be  separated  from  the  physical  output 
incorporating innovation (not always the innovation  is tradable). Moreover, being 
firm uncertain about the effects of innovation on turnover growth, they tend to 
spread  costs  at  the  current  output  value  rather  than  at  future  expected  value. 
Grossmann (2008) states that a positive relationship between R&D expenditures 
and size is associated to the imperfection of capital markets (larger organisations 
have easier access to external funding of such investments), to greater capability of 
internalising  spillover  (see  also  Geroski  1998)  and  to  greater  opportunities  of 
diversifying R&D investments. In general, larger, diversified firms are better able 
to spread the risk of innovation over a large number of projects, increasing the 
propensity  to  sustain  such  expenditures  (Geroski  1998;  Coad  2007).  Empirical 
evidence confirms such hypothesis (Cohen and Levin 1989; Cohen and Klepper 
1996 a and b, Kumar et al. 1999; Bosma and de Wit 2004; Pagano and Schivardi 
2003).  
Previous  conclusions  could  be  adapted  to  other  components  of  intangible 
assets. Grossmann (2008) stresses the existence of a positive correlation between 
size,  marketing/promotion  expenditures  and  R&D  investments.  An  increase  in 
advertising  expenditures  determines  indeed  an  increase  of  both  industry 
concentration and firm size. Simultaneously, an increase in market shares (due to 
higher concentration) increases the earnings of R&D investments, since such costs 
are to be spread on a larger volume of output. Also informational fixed costs have 
similar  bounds.  Audretsch  and  Thurik  (2004)  believe  that  small  firms  bear  a 
disadvantage in sustaining indivisible sunk investments, such as the acquisition of 
knowledge  on  international  markets,  the  development  of  long  distance 
communication  tools  and  the  negotiation  with  local  governments.
22  Finally, 
observing the higher stability of larger organisations, Fogel et al (2006) retrieve 
Holmstrom (1989) thesis that with an increase in size, managers and employees 
appear  to  be  more  inclined  to  invest  in  firm-specific  human  capital.  The 
explanation is that the incentive to large investments in such form of individual 
human capital, having a postponed and uncertain profitability, is strong only in 
contexts guaranteeing an extended operational life of the organisation over time. 
Intangible  assets,  moreover,  have  high  degrees  of  complementarity.  Their 
productivity in terms of earning benefits is linked to the variety and completeness 
in different investment lines. Even from such perspective only larger organisations 
are able to diversify their investments in intangible capital.
2324 
                                                            
22 Similar conclusions are reached by Dean et al (1998). In their study on the impacts of structural 
components on the entry in the market of small or large organisations, they assess that sunk costs 
influence negatively the former, but not the latter 
23 The protection of intangible assets property rights could be positively linked to firm size (see also 
Kumar et al, 1999) 
24 The size-producivity relationship can be (at least indirectly) associated with the ability to internally 
cumulate intangible assets. Recent works stressed a productivity differential in favour of larger firms. 
Pagano and Schivardi (2003) and Bartelsman et al (2003) find that, focusing on the manufacturing   14
Finally, Dosi et al. (2000) observe that, if size doesn’t affect positively productive 
efficiency and innovation capabilities, it is very likely that threshold effects will 
come  into  action  so  that  firms  underneath  such  threshold  will  not  be  able  to 
implement  innovative  productive  procedures,  characterised  by  organisational 
complexity. Such bounds appear to be also relevant as far as logistics, distribution, 
post-sale service, marketing and financial functions are concerned.  
 
5.2  Variables spurring firms to abandon large size. 
 
The success of  medium enterprises is the result of opposite forces, pushing 
towards an increase in organisational size on one hand, and the shift to smaller 
structures on the other. It is also important to observe (Powell 2001) how goods 
and  services  demand  became  in  recent  years  more  and  more  differentiated. 
Potential  size  of  single  markets  hence  shrink,  acquiring  the  typical  features  of 
monopolistic  competition,  reducing  economic  space  for    larger  organisations. 
There  are  indeed  many  exceptions,  even  if  the  clear  trend  is  towards  supply 
segmentation  and  strengthening  of  entry  barriers  is  becoming  more  and  more 
common. The size of single markets is hence such to allow growth, being however 
incompatible  with  organisations  of  huge  size.  Uncertainty  and  other  external 
factors suggest, moreover, the adoption of flattered hierarchical structures (Rajan 
and Wulf 2006) and promote downsizing processes (Baumol et al. 2003). All these 
phenomena  explain  the  success  of  organisations  of  intermediate  size.  The 
development of intermediate markets allows the separation of turnover expansion 
from the internal availability of production inputs. Even in this case it is possible to 
grow without becoming “too big”. Finally, uncertainties on future demand ask for 
the minimisation of exit costs in case of failure. This explains the success of the 
group  form,  with  players  maintaining  juridical  independence,  avoiding  the 
expansion of the productive scale of original organisation (Iacobucci 2008).  
Even the outcome of recent studies on labour division confirm that productive 
de-verticalisation  represents  a  face  of  a  broader  process  of  re-thinking  of  the 
overall structure of larger firms. Literatures on the modularisation and co-evolution 
of supply chain systems (Prencipe et al. 2003; Lewin and Koza 2001;  Lewin and 
Volberda  1999;  Baldwin  and  Clark  1997)  show  that  the  extension  of  labour 
division, even if spurring the withdrawal of firm boundaries, leads to the formation 
of firms with variable productive scale, and usually of intermediate size (Sturgeon 
2002). Also in this case, present trends seem to head towards firm downsizing; not 
an absolute productive fragmentation, however, but rather an increase in variety 
and pluralism of size configurations.
25  
                                                                                                                                      
industry of developed countries, higher productivity growth rates correspond to larger size. Foresti, 
Guelpa and Trenti (2008) show how the productivity gap between Italian and European firms can be 
largely explained by the size gap that hinders Italian organisations.  
25 The shift in the technological nature of products seems to operate in a similar direction, as well. A 
growing number of goods (or services) has multi-technological features, result of the harmonisation of 
distinct  technological  inputs  originally  developed  by  different  organisations  (Hobday  1999).  The 
combination of different technological families in a single product represents a challenge to vertical 
integration as well as to the concept and production of such products within a single firm. External links 
and long-term cooperation schemes represent a deep-rooted component of present organisational assets. 
If it is of great appeal to set up a long-term cooperative network, there is on the other hand little interest 
in internal growth.    15
The emerging and consolidation of a broad set of medium sized enterprises is 
the  result  of  a  process  of  reorganisation,  which  is  now  influenced  by  opposite 
forces.  Growth  has  marked  character  of  selectivity,  and  is  tempered  by 
diseconomies and constraints linked to large size. Firms that grew actually exploit 
intangible assets mainly developed within the organisation and then deployed in 
operational contexts that are new in terms of market extension, competitive factors 
and  competition  regimes.  Growth  would  not  be  an  option  open  to  all  existing 
production units. It doesn’t appear to be mechanically determined by exogenous 
factors, nor it has an epidemic nature. It doesn’t imply, in other words, a change in 
the average size of plants, or an univocal change in  industrial  structures, as it used 
to happen in past decades, either towards smaller or larger size.  
The interpretative scheme here adopted, moreover, doesn’t provide any insights 
on future evolutions of medium sized enterprises. If growth was not inevitable in 
the past, it is not to be considered as certain for the near future. On the contrary, the 
previously  discussed  issues  lead  to  the  cancellation  of  a  positive  relationship 




6. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS TO INTERNAL GROWTH: THE FINANCIAL FACTOR AND 
THE ROLE OF “PRIVATE EQUITY”  
 
In previous paragraphs, the focus was on the role of internal assets, especially 
intangible  ones,  in  firm  growth.  In  the  framework  of  the  well-known  Kumar 
classification  (Kumar  et  al.  1999),  technological  and  organisational  analytical 
schemes were put in the spotlight. In other approaches such as the institutional one, 
the role played by other external variables influencing internal growth is relevant; 
it is the case of the efficiency of judicial system and the development of financial 
markets. The importance of the former has been stressed in recent years, being 
capable of reducing internal coordination costs (Becker e Murphy 1992) and, by 
protecting external investors, facilitating the funding of larger organisations (La 
Porta 1997). However, the issue is difficult to be empirically assessed, as only 
cross-country analyses are available. 
 On the other hand, the role of financial markets (especially the existence of the 
financial constraint) are traditional themes, with plenty available literature as well 
as  empirical  evidence.  Focusing  on  recent  works,  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998) 
provide a broader generalisation of King and Levine (1993) results, assessing the 
positive role of the financial component on the growth process of manufacturing 
firms, through both the development of existing firms and facilitating the entry of 
newcomers. 
More cautious results appear in Cabral and Mata (2003); the focus here is on 
the size distribution of firms. For young firms, such distribution is piled up on the 
left (firms are usually small when they begin operating), while older firms have a 
distribution  which is  more evenly  spread. The reason is  to be identified in the 
financial constraints (fc): the size of a given firm at start up stage is given by the 
minimum value of MES (technology linked) and the financial availabilities of the 
entrepreneur. In case of fc, hence,  the firm is forced to adopt a sub-optimal size. 
However, the effects of fc on size distribution are ambiguous: in every sector, the   16
mitigation of fc involves the growth of size (thus increasing the average size) as 
well as the entry of newcomers (obtaining the opposite result). Beck et al (2004) 
confirm  that  the  growth  effect  caused  by  financial  availability  is  favourable  to 
small firms rather than large ones.  
Angelini and Generale (2005)
26 believe that there is indeed a fc, influencing 
firm growth and especially new organisations. However the constraint itself is not 
significant (as in Cabral and Mata 2003) on the overall economic activity, as it 
affects  a  minority  of  firms  within  each  size  class.
27  The  scant  relevance  of  fc 
(which in the World Bank database doesn’t refer to bank credit alone) is typical of 
OECD  countries,  while  the  situation  is  different  in  non-OECD  countries;  this 
means that financial binds are not relevant in case of mature financial systems. 
Moreover,  we  should  stress  that  fc  not  only  have  different  impacts  on 
smaller/larger organisations or in OECD/non OECD countries, but also the specific 
local context within a given country appears to be relevant (Guiso et al. 2003). 
Guelpa and Tirri (2004) analysis demonstrates that the tighter the relationship with 
the bank and the higher the concentration of cash points in the area, the lower the 
chance for the firm to suffer restrictions in bank credit.
28 Lastly, fc differ as far as 
their underlying motivations are concerned. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1996) observed 
how  firms  in  different  countries  used  to  finance  with  external  funds  the 
development  of  assets  in  the  short-term,  resorting  to  self-financing  when  they 
invest  in  fixed  capital;  according  to  a  recent  (2007)  Gallup  survey  for  the 
Observatory of European SMEs,
29 the role of fc is perceived as of medium-low 
relevance as far as the ordinary management of the firm
30 is concerned, and of 
higher (but  not preponderant) relevance as regards the  financing of innovation.  
Note  how  the  perception  of  the  relevance  of  fc  as  obstacles  to  both  ordinary 
activity  and  innovation  tends  to  diminish  as  the  firms  either  grow  in  size,  or 
localise in European countries with well developed financial markets.  
It  appears  to  be  universally  agreed  that  the  importance  of  fc  as  barriers  to 
growth is greater for firms in early stages of their activity, while after a certain size 
threshold,  it  doesn’t  appear  to  be  a  significant  constraint.  However,  it  is  also 
necessary to keep into adequate account other variables such as the development of 
financial markets, either “local” or not. 
Particularly severe appears to be the scarcity of self-financing funds for firms 
wishing to adopt a strategy of innovation. In such cases, it should be advisable for 
firms to resort to external capital risk (private equity) rather than financing through 
borrowed capital and bank loans.
31 This is explained by the existing information 
                                                            
26 Angelini and Generale use Mediocredito (1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001: firms with more than 10 
employees) and WBES (World Bank, World Business Environment Survey 1998 and 2000: firms with 
more than 5 employees) sources, thus referring to non-Italian contexts, as well. 
27 In Italy, the financial constraint is relevant for less than 5% of the firms of Mediocredito sample  
(5.6% for firms with less than 6 years of activity). The incidence grows and differentiates for age-
classes (16.7% overall, 21.2% for “young” firms) if we adopt broader fc definitions, considering those 
organisations that need heavier credit, and fail to obtain it. 
28 Firm age and size, on the other hand, seem to play marginal roles 
29 EC Eurobarometer Team (sample of over 16.000 firms) 
30 Other structural factors play a bigger role, such as administrative regulation, lack of qualified work, 
labour cost and infrastructures-related issues 
31 For the Italian case, see Del Colle et al (2006) and Magri (2007)   17
asymmetry since most innovative small enterprises tend to hide the features of their 
competitive advantage (new product or process), fearing imitation by competitors. 
It is thus difficult for banks to exert an aware activity of selection, monitoring and 
financing,  since  the  intangible  assets  of  the  firm,  representing  its  source  of 
competitive advantage, are kept secret.
32  
It hence appears that private equity and venture capital
33 are the better choice 
for  small  and  innovative  enterprises
34.  Private  equity  real  benefit  is  that  of 
providing managerial skills as well, which are often lacking in firms at the start-up 
phase  (which  on  the  other  hand  possess  relevant  technological  competences). 
Moreover,  the  presence  of  private  equity  represent  a  signal  useful  to  reduce 
information  asymmetry,  making  new  capital  available:  a  mix  of  financing, 
expertise and reputation, and “informed capital” to use Susi’s words (2002). This 
function is highlighted by Gompers and Lerner review (2001). 
Firms  exploiting  private  equity  show  far  better  performances  than  average 
organisations.  In  the  USA,  over  the  2000-2003  period,  the  growth  rate  of 
employment in venture-backed firms was 7%, while other firms set a 2% decrease, 
with  even  broader  ranges  within  specific  sectors.
35  These  differences  between 
venture capital and non venture capital backed organisations are present even if we 
focus on other variables such as turnover growth rather than added value or firm 
profitability (EBITDA). 
Actually, for the above mentioned variables, the effective causality link between 
venture capital and innovation (hence growth) is not ascertained. Firms backed by 
forms of venture capital could be better able to pursue innovative strategies, thanks 
to  the  ability  of  venture  capitalists  to  adequately  select  firms  to  be  supported 
(which would have anyhow introduced advanced technologies, no matter what the 
nature of funding was). 
This  second  interpretation,  emphasizing  the  role  of  technological  systems 
(technological opportunities, appropriability conditions, innovation sector systems 
and demand nature and dynamics, Malerba 2004) and hence giving an ancillary 
role to venture capital, is also suggested by the anecdotic annotation that private 
equity approves a little share of interventions being proposed (around 3% in Italy), 
while the share of self-declared innovative firms is much higher (44% in Europe in 




                                                            
32 This part is influenced by the discussions held with Luciano Balbo and Anna Gervasoni, whom we 
thank 
33  Private  equity  activities  can  be  divided  into  venture  capital  (financing  firms’  startup  and 
development) and buyout (financing the substitution of property structure). We here focus only on 
venture capital. 
34 Innovative enterprises seem to play an important role in the industrial scenario, as 36% of Italian 
firms with more than 10 employees declared having performed R&D activities during the 2002-2004 
period of time (mainly, process innovations). The figure slightly decreases (33%) for 10-49 employees 
firms (ISTAT 2006). 
35 For instance, in the biotechnology sector, venture-backed firms score a +23% (overall score: 5%), 
while in the Energy sector the results are +1% and -9%, respectively.    18
7.  TASKS  AND  ROLE  OF  INDUSTRIAL  POLICY  SUPPORTING  FIRM  GROWTH:  AN 
OVERVIEW  
 
Economic policies, and specifically industrial policies for growth, represent a 
further external variable SMEs should carefully take into account. These firms
36 
should avail a favorable treatment due to their occupational importance: European 
micro-firms (1-9 employees) represent 29.8% of jobs in the private sector, small 
firms (10-49) represent 20.8% and medium firms (50-249) a further 16.5%, for an 
total of 67% (European Commission 2007).  
The  increase  in  the  number  of  SMEs  can  be  viewed  as  one  of  possible 
development triggers: micro-entrepreneurship allows avoiding unemployment, thus 
SME-supporting policies (at least at the start-up stage) can be justified taking into 
account the significant positive externalities they produce. As far as the growth 
phase is concerned, Bianchi et al. (2004, p. 381) mention a number of SME market 
failures, suggesting the implementation of defensive policies tailored to the specific 
needs of such type of enterprise. They can be articulated in three main groups, and 
we can note that, depending on what triggers them: 
-  limited  resources  imply  difficulties  in  access  to  information  as  well  as  in 
attracting high-profile human capital (wages cannot stand competitors’ levels); 
- SMEs suffer a form of discrimination in accessing the financial market due to 
the information asymmetry with the subjects according loans;  
- if SMEs share specific markets with larger organisations, they can only play a 
subordinate role, given the potential dominant position
37 of the latter
38. 
There is a broad range of tools and policies that can be implemented favouring 
SMEs, even in those national contexts where the preservation of competition is a 
milestone of public intervention in economy. EU
39 constituted a specific Policy for 
SMEs  within  DG  “Enterprise  and  Industry”;  there  is  an  exemption  from  the 
                                                            
36  In  Europe:  micro-firms  1-9  employees;  small  firms  10-49  employees;  medium  firms  50-249 
employees. 
37  Which  seldom  develops  in  an  abuse  of  dominant  position,  to  be  prosecuted  by  competition 
legislation. It is hence a gap that cannot be adjusted through legal actions and which, in absence of 
product differentiation and local markets, would develop in a situation where small firms either grow or 
end their activities: which is partially what actually happens. 
38 This would be the result of the presence of lower costs (thanks to traditional scale economies) and 
lower profit margins (or at least in line with those of SMEs, so that they can practise lower costs for a 
given product); it could also regard the capability of larger organisations to practice a differentiated 
offer,  sharing  upstream  costs  that  SMEs  cannot  afford  (lack  of  adequate  human  resources,  R&D, 
marketing activities etc) 
39 WTO holds a neutral position as far as subsides to SMEs are concerned (export aids within the 
Agreement on Subsides and Countervailing Measures, SCM)   19
prohibition of State aids
40 and de minimis 
41mechanism, and they have facilitations 
in the field of R&D and Innovation.
42 
As far as public procurement is concerned, many Countries (not the EU legislative 
framework)  set  specific  “reserves”  for  SMEs;  moreover  the  US  and  Canada 
obtained  exemptions  to  general  rules  of    WTO’s  Government  Procurement 
Agreement  (Ninni,  2001).
43  In  Italy,  such  support  for  SMEs  created  a  sort  of 
institutional dualism, a “particular form of regulation that introduced incentives, 
protection forms and externalities that vary from small to large firms” (Arrighetti 
and Seravalli, 1997). 
However, it is up to debate whether the relevance of SMEs as regards both 
employment  and  innovation,  as  well  as  the  market  failure  they  face,  justify  a 
selective behaviour in their favour. There is little doubt as far as the creation of the 
firm is concerned. Public aid is justified not only by the creation of new jobs
44, but 
also  by  the  strengthening  of  entrepreneurship  in  those  that  are  momentarily 
unemployed, increasing at once innovation offer.  
Regarding the phase of development and size growth, public intervention could 
turn out to be counterproductive in terms of internal growth, as this might cause 
losing benefits linked to small size. This sort of disincentive might have a limited 
empirical relevance, however it is certainly a possibility to be taken into account. 
From the point of view of general welfare, this discouraging effect might add 
up with the partial pointlessness of selective aids for firm growth, as the latter 
should be transferred from the demand side to the supply side.  Indeed, most of the 
aids provided for by Bianchi et alii either lack a specific motivation to be triggered 
(e.g intervention regarding access to financial markets, which on the other hand are 
relevant in the creation of a firm) or they should focus on supply, increasing the 
availability  of  human  resources  recurring  for  instance  to  immigration.  It  is 
somehow what happened to information access, since the increase in supply made 
access broader and cheaper even for SMEs. A policy strengthening the supply of 
scarce  resources,  along  with  the  legislative  framework  adopted  by  the  EU,  is 
relevant  especially  as  far  as  intangible  assets  availability  is  concerned,  which 
probably represent a fundamental variable in orientating internal growth of firms. 
                                                            
40 Commission Regulation 70/2001, January 12th 2001:(on the application of art 87-88 of the Treaty): 
aid to SMEs investments in tangible and intangible immobilization is consistent with the common 
market, and is not subject to notification, as long as such aid doesn’t exceed 15% or 7.5% of costs for 
small and medium enterprises, respectively (nor exceeding 10% and 15%, respectively, of Regional aid 
ceiling for those Regions providing for such form of support). 
41 All firms can benefit from these support measures (for an amount not exceeding 200.000 Euros in 
three years, exempted from notification duty), and SMEs are the type of organisation exploiting this 
opportunity the most.  
42 Especially as far as property rights and high-profile personnel costs are concerned.  
43  EU itself is trying to simplify the procedures for Public Procurement, where the role played by 
SMEs is marginal due to administrative costs and bureaucratic hindrances. 
44 While the gross creation of jobs in developed countries is mainly related to SMEs, the role of these in 
creating net employment is less clear, as empiric evidence is lacking a generalised and agreed-upon 
conclusion. Moreover, in many emerging economies (e.g. Africa), it is larger firms that contribute the 
most to the gross job creation (Biggs, 2006).   20
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